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Elsewhere in this Symposium issue, Professor Mark Geistfeld
presents an argument favoring the application of risk-utility
analysis to the duty to warn doctrine encompassed by the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts. In addition, the comments and the reporters'
notes to the Restatement (Third) suggest altering the traditional
duty to warn if the warning would cause "information overload," if
the danger is "open and obvious," or if the danger applies to only a
small percentage of potential customers.
In response to Geistfeld and the Restatement (Third) comments
and notes, Rheingold and Feinglass assert that applying a risk-
utility analysis or altering the duty to warn in certain cases
undermines the doctrine and does not reflect the application of the
doctrine by the courts. Instead, Rheingold and Feinglass argue that
the traditional duty to warn doctrine should remain the focus of the
Restatement (Third). The authors point to the text of the Restate-
ment (Third); the potential difficulties in determining the utility of
a warning or the social cost of "information overload"; the minimal
cost of providing a warning even in marginal cases; and the
competency of juries to apply the traditional doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
This Article comments upon the thoughtful piece by Professor
Mark Geistfeld' and more broadly, presents our arguments in
favor of the current draft of the duty to warn doctrine presented
in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.2 We
contend that a risk-utility3 analysis is misplaced in the warning
* Trial Lawyer, Rheingold, Valet & Rheingold, P.C.; Advisor, Restatement Third
of Torts: Products Liability. B.A. 1955, Oberlin College; L.L.B. 1958, Harvard Law
School.
** Associate, Kopff, Nardelli & Dopf, LLP. B.A. 1992, University of Michigan; J.D.
1995, Brooklyn Law School.
1. See Mark Geistfeld, Inadequate Product Warnings and Causation, 30 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 309 (1997).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrY § 2(c) (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2].
3. Risk-utility analysis is also known as risk-benefit analysis.
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defect context, and that other forms of economic analysis are
similarly unavailing. In addition, we are critical of comments
made by the Reporters in the draft Restatement to hedge in the
duty to warn, and we defend the current state of the practice.
The concepts of a duty to warn and a product defect arising
out of an inadequate warning are used synonymously in the
draft Restatement (Third) commentary and in this Article. The
draft Restatement (Third) sets forth the formulation of what
constitutes a defect in the labeling of a product:
[A] product is defective because of inadequate instructions
or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the
seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the com-
mercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the
instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably
safe.4
This well-accepted definition of the duty5 appears in most
texts and decisions.6 Unlike some of the more controversial
"restatements" of products liability law elsewhere in the draft
Restatement, this statement has escaped meaningful debate.
Controversy arises, however, from the re-analysis of the duty to
warn performed by Professor Geistfeld,v as well as others,'
4. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2(c).
5. The draft Restatement (Third) properly makes no distinction betweenwarnings,
directions, and instructions. Those terms often are summarized in this Article by the
term "warning" or "labeling."
6. The proposed Restatement (Third) takes the fundamental course of attempting
to eliminate distinctions between strict liability and negligence, and instead would
create liability if the product is defective. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2;
see also id. § 1 cmt. a, at 4 ("Rather than perpetuating confusion spawned by existing
doctrinal categories, §§ 1 and 2 define the liability for each form of defect in terms
directly addressing the various kinds of defects."). One type of defect is "inadequate
instructions or warnings." See id. § l(b). Undoubtedly, however, a negligence standard
is employed in defining the warning defect, see supra text accompanying note 4, in that
three modifiers are used to invoke the negligence standard: the risk must be
"foreseeable"; the warnings to be given need be merely "reasonable"; and the product
need be only "reasonably" safe. See id. § 2(c).
7. See generally Geistfeld, supra note 1.
8. See Theodore S. Jankowski, Focusing on Quality and Risk: The Central Role
of Reasonable Alternatives in Evaluating Design and Warning Decisions, 36 S. TEx. L.
REv. 283, 326-39 (1995) (arguing that to supply balance to risk-utility analysis in
defect-in-warnings cases judges must focus on reasonableness of warnings and the
functionality of the warning's "risk communication" instead of on completeness of
warnings and their effect on the utility of the "whole product"); see also Symposium,
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including a law review article by the two Reporters on the
project, Professors James Henderson and Aaron Twerski. 9
Further, the official comments and reporters' notes, as com-
pared to the black letter of the law, introduce another layer of
controversy.
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, INCLUDING RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS,
Is NOT PERTINENT TO ANALYSIS OF THE DUTY TO WARN
The new Restatement proposes to place the use of a risk-
utility analysis at the heart of one of the main bases for
liability: the product design.'" Once plaintiffs assert that a
product was defective by virtue of design, they are then obliged
to present an evaluation of te risks and costs associated with
the product as contrasted with its utility. Indeed, a highly
controversial requirement built into the black letter law of
design defect requires that plaintiffs demonstrate a "reasonable
alternative design,"" one that would have been of similar
utility, of no greater cost and yet of greater safety.
12
Professor Geistfeld and others suggest that the risk-utility
test is incorporated likewise into the parallel section of the
draft Restatement (Third) on a warning defect.' 3 Not only is the
Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 361,
389-401, 415-17 (1995) (presenting articles that compare duty to warn in Restatement
(Third) with the duty to warn in Minnesota, and that criticize the Restatement (Third)
for its exclusive focus on the conduct of manufacturers and for the absence of a
requirement that manufacturers remain mindful of consumer expectations); William H.
Hardie, Use of Product Warning Labels as a Reminder, 24 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep.
(BNA) 739, 748 (Aug. 9, 1996) (noting that the "law does not impose on manufacturers
any duty to compel behavioral compliance with warnings").
9. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse
in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265 (1990)
(arguing that deep doctrinal problems exist with regard to negligence litigation
involving failure to warn products liability cases).
10. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2(b); see also id. § 2 cmt. a, at 14
(noting that when analyzing defects based on inadequate warnings "some sort of
independent assessment of relevant advantages and disadvantages ... is necessary").
11. See id. § 2(b).
12. See id. § 2 cmt. e (suggesting that a broad range of factors may "be considered
in determining whether an alternative design is reasonable" including overall safety,
effects of the alternative design on production costs, product longevity, maintenance and
repair, aesthetics and marketability).
13. See Ralph D. Davis, Different Treatment of Marketing and Design Defects in
Pure Risk-Utility Balancing: Who's the Villain? 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 41, 49-52 (1989);
Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 327 & n.39.
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black letter statement devoid of such language,14 neither the
comments nor the reporters' notes indicates that a judge or jury
should consider such an analysis in determining whether a
warning was adequate. 5 One therefore could attempt to rest a
case by showing the absence of any such language, especially
because every nuance of the proposed Restatement's language
has been reviewed extensively.'6
A. The Role of Economic Analysis
It is hardly surprising that someone who analyzes legal
doctrines from an economist's standpoint would examine the
rule of law in the warning area in economic terms. In general,
Professor Geistfeld would have the trier of fact consider the
costs involved in creating a label of the type a plaintiff contend-
ed was adequate. 7 His definition of costs, however, includes the
social costs to the consumer of having to read a longer label,
rather than just the economic price of printing that label.'" He
would attempt to analogize this cost to the expense a supplier
would incur in adding to a product certain features (such as a
safety guard) that would make the product unreasonably
expensive from a purchaser's perspective.
Courts, in their practical approach to dispute resolution,
have rejected the use of a risk-utility test in the warning
defect area, and in particular have refused to regard the time
of the consumer's increased label reading as a "cost" in the
calculus of liability.'" For example, in Ross Laboratories v.
14. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2(c).
15. See id. § 2(c) cmt. h & reporters' note.
16. The drafting of the proposed Restatement (Third) began in 1992 with the
American Law Institute's (the ALI) appointment of the 15 Reporters and Advisors. The
senior author is one of the 15 Advisors. Numerous meetings have occurred over the
years with the Advisors, the Members' Consultative Group, and the Council of the ALI.
17. See Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 327.
18. See id. at 322-23.
19. Cf. Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129-30 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating
that manufacturer of polio vaccine had a duty to warn of one in a million chance of
contracting the disease after vaccination); Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F.2d
623, 626 (2d Cir. 1961) (noting that the burden of warning about improper product use
was small when balanced with the danger the warning could prevent); Ross Lab. v.
Thies, 725 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska 1986) (finding that the cost of giving an adequate
warning is so minimal that "balance must always be struck in favor of the obligation
to warn" where ordinary user will not recognize a danger from the product); Moran v.
Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 15 (Md. 1975) (finding the cost of giving a warning about
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Thies,2" an infant suffered serious injuries from ingestion of
an undiluted liquid glucose product.2 ' The court refused to
engage in a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the
warning was adequate because "[t]he cost of giving an adequate
warning is usually so minimal ... that the balance must
always be struck in favor of the obligation to warn ... ."" At
best, courts give lip service to the use of a risk-utility test in
warning defect cases, but make the use of the test meaningless
in practice by limiting the cost concept to the suppliers' costs of
providing a warning, always a negligible factor.
Academics are split on the advisability of resort to economic
analysis in duty-to-warn cases. 23 Professor Howard Latin has
argued quite convincingly that the risk-utility test has no role
in warning cases, in part because the courts have no basis by
which to measure the "utility" part of the equation.24 He also
comments that application of this sort of balancing test, as
useful as it may be in design cases, would not achieve any
greater consistency in liability determination than the present
mode of jury presentation.
25
Those who are particularly critical of the present status of
the law in the warning area, with Professors Henderson and
Twerski chief among them, perceive a general, fundamental
error in allowing suits to proceed on a defect-in-warning theo-
ry.26 The reasons as variously expressed are that doing so
invites lawlessness on the part of the jury, and courts have no
the flammability of cologne minimal compared to the danger posed by the product);
Wheeler v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 419 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)
(noting that the cost of placing a warning sticker on a tire was very low compared to
the seriousness of potential harm).
20. 725 P.2d 1076 (Alaska 1986).
21. See id. at 1078.
22. Id. at 1079.
23. See, e.g., Howard Latin, "Good" Warning, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limita-
tions, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1193, 1283 (1994) ("The utility of any ... warning is ultimately
an empirical question on which courts ordinarily will have little basis to make in-
formed judgements."); A.D. Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products
Liability--Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 517 (1976)
(commenting that courts must approach warning issues within the context of all risks
that a manufacturer may have to warn against and must account for societal costs of
warning of remote risks).
24. See Latin, supra note 23, at 1283.
25. See id. at 1284.
26. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 9, at 297. While Henderson and Twerski
would favor the risk-utility concept for all phases of products liability, they believe that
it only would add to the "mess" in the defective warnings context. See id. They
recognized that courts and juries alike would encounter significant problems in trying
to assess the "costs" part of the analysis. See id.
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hard data by which to measure whether, as a matter of law, a
warning should have been given or whether a jury verdict
should be set aside as against the weight of the evidence.
The rather strident criticisms of the Restatement (Third)
Reporters 27 failed to become a part of the black letter of the
draft. The most logical explanation for that failure is that the
Reporters recognized that their views did not reflect the
mainstream analysis of the warning defect. Nonetheless their
views have infiltrated the comments and reporters' notes. This
is notable in their discussion of the law in the areas of "infor-
mation overload"; duty to warn of "open and obvious" dangers;
and the "allergy" situation.2' Regarding these three branches of
duties in the warning area, the Reporters' comments in these
areas subversively attempt to undermine the general and well-
accepted rule.29
B. Warnings for Purchase vs. Warnings for Use
The Restatement draft, 30 Professor Geistfeld,
31 and others32
draw a distinction between warnings or other information used
for decisionmaking by a prospective purchaser and for methods
of safe use of the product. In the former situation, the user
reads the label before purchase (e.g., in the drugstore) and
supposedly decides whether to use the product and knowingly
assume its unavoidable risks. This concept is sometimes called
"informed consent."33 In the latter situation, warnings and
27. See id. at 265-71 (criticizing the failure-to-warn doctrine as theoretically
flawed and practically unworkable).
28. Id. at 297-99, 297 n.139, 305-06.
29. See discussion infra Part II.
30. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. h ("Warnings alert users to
the existence and nature of product risks so that they can prevent harm either by
appropriate conduct during use or consumption or by choosing not to use or consume.").
31. See Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 311-12 n.l1 (arguing that the de facto presump-
tion that an adequate warning would have prevented the injury is necessary to give sel-
lers sufficient incentive to disclose information pertaining to unavoidable risks, but is
not necessary to supply the incentive to disclose information pertaining to product use).
32. See David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in Product Liability Failure to Warn
Cases, 17 J. PROD. & Toxics LIAB. 271, 271-72 (1995) (distinguishing between "safe-
use instructions" and "informed-choice warnings"); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen,
Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation,
1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 607, 621-22 (distinguishing between "informed-choice" warnings
cases and the more common "risk-reduction" warnings cases).
33. See Fischer, supra note 32, at 271-72.
WINTER AND SPRING 1997]
directions tell the purchaser how to use the product safely and
avoid the danger. This function is sometimes referred to as the
warning's "risk reduction."34
Professor Geistfeld concentrates almost exclusively on the
informed consent aspect of a warning.35 Our first response to
this concentration is that litigation rarely rests on an informed-
consent theory. Most warning cases that the senior author has
handled involved the adequacy of the labeling as it relates to
proper use of the product. Product users are often not purchas-
ers (consider the operator of a machine in a factory or a pedes-
trian hit by a defective vehicle). Finally, even purchasers decide
whether to buy a product for reasons other than warnings
about unavoidable side effects associated with the product, and
instead call a lawyer only when they feel that their injury
resulted from not being warned about the risks associated with
use of the product.
Why a proponent of risk-utility analysis would choose to posit
for examination the purchase-informed consent paradigm is
understandable. It is here, if anywhere, that one could start to
think about a risk versus benefit analysis: The buyer considers
the condition he has for which he is purchasing the product or
considers what are the side effects from using it. When one
claims that directions for use were inadequate, however, noth-
ing in the actual conduct of consumers lends itself to analysis
of costs and benefits; they merely desire to proceed safely.
II. UNDERMINING THE BLACK LETTER DUTY TO WARN
BY LIMITING IT IN COMMENTS
One reading of the text of the proposed Restatement (Third)
finds a firm commitment to the imposition of a duty to warn
and to submitting questions of adequacy to the jury. The com-
ments and reporters' notes, however, tend to undermine the
proposition by suggesting to courts ways to withhold certain
cases from the jury. This section considers three of these sug-
gested media.
34. See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 32, at 622.
35. See Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 345-48.
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A. "Information Overload"
Academics, cognitive scientists, and economists have ad-
vanced the concept that too many warnings can be undesir-
able. 36 The theory is that if users see a mass of material on a
label they will decide to read nothing, or they will read a
portion of the label, but somehow will miss the important part
that relates to their use. In practice, defendants use the "over-
load" concept as a defense or excuse,37 when a warning about a
particular hazard was omitted but later proves germane to the
safety of the product. To have included a warning regarding
the pertinent risk, defendants allege, would have resulted in
undesirable information overload.
Although the comments of the draft Restatement contain
nothing about the risk of requiring too numerous warnings, the
reporters' notes provide some case authority for the proposi-
tion.3' Not all professors with economic or cognitive training,
however, embrace the overload concept. A team of law profes-
sors and economists have produced an examination in which
they undermine the concept of information overload3 9 In their
view, rather than inducing consumer paralysis, a large quanti-
ty of information assists the user in researching the data
needed to make a decision about the safe use of a product.4 °
Thus, because consumers select a few attributes of a product to
36. See Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 310 (noting that "overenforcement of the
liability standard provides an incentive to sellers to overwarn about product risks,
which undermines the effectiveness of product warnings"); Naresh K Malhotra,
Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decisionmaking, 10 J.
CONSUMER RES. 436, 438 (1984) ("When presented with 'too much' information,
consumers may become confused, so that they are unable to effectively and efficiently
process the information. .. "); Debra L. Scammon, 'Information Load"and Consumers,
4 J. CONSUMER RES. 148, 148 (1977) (NTIhe utilization of product information by
consumers in their purchase decisions depends both on the availability of information
and the processability (simplicity/complexity) and usefulness of the information to the
consumer.").
37. The California Supreme Court recently rejected a defense of information
overload in a pharmaceutical case. See Carlin v. Superior Ct., 920 P.2d 1347, 1351-52
(Cal. 1996) (rejecting a manufacturer's claim that requiring "warning of dangers that
were known to the scientific community at the time it manufactured or distributed the
product" would lead to "overlabeling").
38. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2 reporters' note cmt. h.
39. See David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An
Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 281-94 (1986).
40. See id. at 286-87.
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serve as a basis of comparison with other products,4 they
conclude that detailed disclosure actually can reduce costs to
consumers of acquiring and processing information.42
In many ways, the debate about overload centers too much
on theory and not enough on reality. Readers of this Article, all
of whom are label readers, surely have noted that information
can be presented in an attention-getting format by listing
information hierarchically. The prominence of location, type
size, or color can emphasize serious risks. In our view, informa-
tion overload should not deter anyone from providing complete
and accurate warnings on labels.
B. "Open and Obvious Danger"
Commentary in the proposed Restatement gives credence to
the concept that products need not contain warnings about
"obvious and generally known" risks.43 The comment, at least,
is rather tepid compared to the Reporters' article on warning,
which invites the judiciary to grant summary judgment in such
cases.44 Indeed, the comment in the draft Restatement would
give the issue to the trier of fact where "reasonable minds may
differ as to whether the risk was obvious or generally known."45
In practice, however, judges and juries have difficulty agreeing
on what is an obvious risk simply because the meaning of the
word "obvious" differs with each person's perspective. Thus,
many writers have been critical of the "open and obvious"
danger rule excusing duty.
4 6
The typical case that the senior author has handled involves
a risk that seems obvious to most highly intelligent people, yet
41. See id. at 281-82.
42. See id. at 294.
43. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. i; id. reporters' note cmt. i.
44. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 9, at 316-17 (arguing that too many cases
involving arguably obvious dangers make their way to juries).
45. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. i.
46. See Michael S. Jacobs, Toward a Process-Based Approach to Failure-to-Warn
Law, 71 N.C. L. REv. 121, 130 (1992) (concluding that the rule suffers from "incurable
indeterminacy" in its "hopeless subjectivity" and "its utter inability to perform its
theoretical limiting function"); Howard A. Latin, Behavioral Criticisms of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 16 J. PROD. & TOxIcS LIAB. 209, 214-17 (1994); M.
Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criticism, 89 W.
VA. L. REv. 221, 253-57 (1987) (noting that "automatic preclusion of liability based only
upon alleged obviousness of the danger ill serves the risk spreading concepts underlying
strict liability in tort").
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obscure to others. In the real world, all types of people use
dangerous machinery and chemicals, both in the course of their
employment and for enjoyment. Because the intelligence of users
of hazardous machines can vary so widely, an "obvious" danger
cannot be defined accurately. Thus, the product supplier should
be required to issue warnings to all types of persons, even if the
risks would be apparent to some. After all, the warnings serve
as reminders to all users.4 7
C. The "Allergy Rule"
In a comment, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) give
credence to yet another instance where a warning might not be
due: where only a small part of the population is potentially at
risk.48 The draft Restatement (Third), however, leaves the issue
fluid. It states that a manufacturer will have a duty to warn
when a "substantial" number of persons might react adversely
to some drug or chemical and it acknowledges that what is
substantial "is not precisely quantifiable."49
Once again, one might ask what the drawback would be to
warning a very small but easily identifiable portion of the
population about serious risks that pertain to their use of a
product. For example, very few people are phenylketonurics, yet
they need to know if a product contains phenylalanine because
its consumption could be brain damaging. One wonders how
many persons who are not phenylketonurics resent being
exposed to this labeling or how many complain of the Geistfeld
concept of an extra cost involved in having to read it. Indeed,
even if people are not at risk, by being educated they can share
the information with others who might be at risk.
Professor Geistfeld criticizes the failure of the drafters to
provide any special rules, whether by black letter or commen-
tary, for proof of causation in warning cases.5o Instead, the draft
Restatement (Third) states that the general laws of causation,
47. See Hill v. Air Shields, Inc., 721 S.W.2d 112, 118 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (noting
that warnings on medical appliances can act as a reminder to doctors or hospitals); Seley
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 839 (Ohio 1981) (commenting that side effects
labeling may remind a physician of what she already knows).
48. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. j & reporters' notes cmt. j.
49. Id. § 2 cmt. j.
50. See Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 310-12 & nn.10-11.
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as set forth elsewhere in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,5'
are to be applied.52 This approach, we believe, is correct as to
the warning defect. Many states have created presumptions or
similar evidentiary concepts for the situation where no warning
or an inadequate warning is given, and the plaintiff or decedent
wants to assert that, had an adequate warning been given, it
would have been heeded.53 The Restatement (Third) does not
discuss this point of the law of evidence, much less undermine
or replace it.
III. Is THERE A GENUINE BASIS FOR ALARM ABOUT LETTING
JURIES DECIDE WARNING DEFECT CASES?
If the traditional concept of duty to warn in products cases is
so wrong,54 why has the third ALI Restatement of that duty
continued to reaffirm traditional law? To answer this requires,
first, an analysis of the reasons given by critics. Their attacks
proceed upon the belief that the current rule encourages
"lawless" practice, in that a court has almost no guidelines for
determining which cases should go to the jury and which should
not.55 Further, they claim that there is no restraint upon
plaintiffs' telling the story their way about what they read and
knew.56 Additionally, they claim that any requirement that
proximate cause be shown has all but been abandoned.57
When one delves more deeply into these criticisms of the
operation of warning duty law, one senses a more fundamental
distrust of the judge and jury system in this country, sometimes
expressed openly, sometimes covertly.58 Drawing a comparison
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-433 (1965).
52. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 10.
53. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 358-59 (Tex. 1993);
Menard v. Newhall, 373 A.2d 505, 506 (Vt. 1977). See generally Fischer, supra note 32,
at 274-75, 278 ("A very common approach [to a plaintiffs problem of proving causation]
is to create a rebuttable presumption that if an adequate warning had been given it
would have been read and heeded.").
54. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 9, at 271 (commenting that the problems
associated with the duty to warn "may defy solution").
55. See id. at 289-91.
56. See id. at 305-06.
57. See id. at 306.
58. See, e.g., Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in
Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 190, 190 (1990) ("In recent years, jurors increasingly
have been criticized as being ill-equipped to adequately decide the issues in cases before
Risk- Utility Analysis
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to design liability, the critics find no "hard evidence," no
scientific proof, no economic certainty, by which they (as
surrogates for the judicial system) can measure whether or not
issues are being properly adjudicated.59
In defense of the current practice, the question presented
becomes where the authority comes from to use the definition
of design defect as the standard by which labeling duties are to
be measured. Perhaps in the design defect context, the proposed
Restatement (Third) has overstepped itself somewhat by intrud-
ing into the trier of fact's sphere by requiring proof of the
"reasonable alternative design."6° Certainly the current system
of determining whether a manufacturer was careless in not
providing an adequate warning is no more "lawless" than the
application of the "reasonable person" standard to other forms
of human conduct, such as driving motor vehicles and maintain-
ing sidewalks.6"
In practice, numerous restraints exist on the operation of law
in cases involving defective labeling, including the limits placed
by the "open and obvious" doctrine and the other concepts
evaluated above-even if we feel that too much emphasis on
those concepts may remove cases where reasonable persons
could differ from jury consideration. Beyond that, judges'
instructions provide a restraint on jury behavior.62
Another restraint is embodied in the requirements relating to
proof of causation, factual and proximate, where a plaintiffs
failure to carry the burden of proof often leads to loss at trial or
to reversal of a favorable verdict on appeal. In analyzing this
area, one must consider the factual situations that present
themselves in actual litigation. Two crucial variables are the
quality of the warning and whether the plaintiff read it. These
produce the following situations:
them."); Jennifer M. Granholm & William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-
Splitting Devices Defeat the Jury's Role, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 505, 508-09 (1995) (noting
that there is a "deep-seated distrust of the jury").
59. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 9, at 297, 305.
60. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 2(b); see also Marshall S. Shapo, In
Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALIRestatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV.
631, 676 (1995) ("It is judges, and sometimes juries, who should make the decision
about the risk-utility comparison-as well as the reasonable consumer expecta-
tions-associated with a particular product. A 'Restatement' should not limit that
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a. No warning made
i. plaintiff read label
ii. plaintiff did not read label
b. Some warning made which plaintiff read, but which
may not be adequate
c. Adequate warning made, but plaintiff did not read it
Not all of the above factual situations will be submitted to a
jury for resolution, notwithstanding the dire statements of
various writers. For example, if a plaintiff did not read an
adequate warning, the case will probably be dismissed. If a
necessary warning were omitted, but the plaintiff did not read
the label anyway, the plaintiff will have difficulty creating a
proximate link between the missing warning and the injury
sustained.3
Virtually every case on labeling that the senior author has
handled has been met with a defense based on causation. The
defendant invariably argues that any fault in the labeling did
not cause the plaintiffs injury. In a recent experience where an
over-the-counter cold remedy contained no warning about
consumption with another drug, the defendant presented a
labeling expert with a Ph.D. in communications, who opined
that the plaintiff would not have heeded any warning given
because he was an alcoholic and a lapsed Mormon, and that in
another context he had failed to heed a doctor's warnings about
mixing drugs.
CONCLUSION
The failure to warn doctrine, like all others, needs a straight-
forward legal standard, but the risk-utility test does not provide
such a standard. Even though the risk-utility test has evolved
as the leading judicial method to evaluate complex product
design issues, it would not function as an effective tool in the
63. See, e.g., Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839, 850-51 (La. 1987) (precluding
recovery because, even though warning in driver's manual was inadequate, the owner
never read the manual).
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warning area because it provides no guidelines for manufactur-
ers on how to increase the quality of warnings. Nor would the
tasks of judges and juries be assisted by the use of a risk-utility
test.
